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Abstract:  
 
The experiences of the developed countries reveals that a good corporate governance could reduces 
risk, stimulates performance, improves access to capital markets, enhances the marketability of 
goods and services, improves leadership, increases the value of the corporations, enables the 
corporation to acquire external finances more easily and at a lower cost.  
In the case of developing and emerging economies the need for corporate governance extends 
beyond resolving problems resulting from the separation of ownership and control. Developing and 
emerging economies are constantly confronted with issues such as the lack of property rights, the 
abuse of minority shareholders or contract violations. But in order that corporate governance 
measures have a strong impact in the economy, a set of democratic, market institutions and legal 
system should be settled up. 
The Romanian governance system follows the patterns of the Continental European model based on 
the internal control of the employees and the management but with some particularities in function 
of the specific economic, political, cultural conditions.  
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Introduction 
 
The concept of corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject and can be defined in different 
ways. Generally, corporate governance is a set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions 
affecting the way a corporation is directed, administered and controlled.   
Narrowly defined, corporate governance reflects the relationships among many players involved – 
the stakeholders - and the goals for which the corporation is governed. The principal players are the 
shareholders, management and the board of directors. Other stakeholders include employees, 
suppliers, customers, banks and other lenders, regulators, the environment and the community at 
large. Therefore, corporate governance is the relationship among various participants in determining 
the direction and performance of corporations (Monks and Minow, 1995).  
From another point of view, corporate governance is about "the whole set of legal, cultural, and 
institutional arrangements that determine what public corporations can do, who controls them, how 
that control is exercised, and how the risks and return from the activities they undertake are 
allocated."  (Blair, 1995).  
Different practices and structures of corporate governance need to be analyzed in strong correlation 
with the agent theory, taking into consideration that they reflect actually, the concern for reduction 
of agent costs and minimization the conflict between shareholders and managers. The separation of 
ownership from control implies a loss of effective control by shareholders over managerial 
decisions. As a result of this separation, it is introduced a system of corporate governance controls 
in order to assist in aligning the incentives of managers with those of shareholders. So the efficiency 
of different systems of corporate governance is being appreciated in function of their capacity to 
solve different inevitable conflicts that appears between social partners of the firm (stakeholders), 
especially between shareholders and managers. 
A related issue focuses on the impact of a corporate governance system in economic efficiency, 
through which the corporate governance system should aim to optimize economic results, with a 
strong emphasis on shareholders welfare.  
Taking in consideration that corporate governance is an economic field that investigates how to 
secure/motivate efficient management of corporations by the use of incentive mechanisms (such as 
contracts, organizational designs and legislation), this is often limited to the question of improving 
financial performance: for example, how the corporate owners can secure or motivate that the 
corporate managers will deliver a competitive rate of return (Mathiesen, 2002) or the way suppliers 
of finance sources assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). 
The performance of the enterprise does not resume itself just to superior financial accounting 
results, respectively maximum profit, stabile financial balance, the capacity of generating cash 
flows for its functioning and expanding, but regards all non-financial and financial aspects of its 
activity. The performance of quoted firms is significantly influenced by the form of corporate 
governance, respectively the capacity of decision factors to identify and harmonize the interests of 
the social partners.  
The importance of corporate governance was underlined, in a surprising way by the economic crisis 
around the world. In a globalized economy, companies and countries with weak corporate 
governance systems are likely to suffer serious consequences beyond financial crises.   
Furthermore, global forces are shaping the continuing development of corporate governance. 
Although implementing corporate governance is beneficial for firms and countries, the rapid pace of 
globalization has made this need urgent, especially for developing and emerging countries. More 
and more, it becomes clear that good corporate governance is a key for the integrity of corporations, 
financial institutions and markets, an important factor for the health of the economies and their 
stability. 
Principle and codes of corporate governance:. Particularities for developing and emerging 
countries 
 
The key elements of good corporate governance principles include fairness, accountability, 
responsibility and transparency.  Thus, focusing the attention of the business community on trusting 
investors and on basic principles of corporate governance has materialized internationally on the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. The original principles were released by OECD in May 
1999 in response to the growing awareness of the importance of good corporate governance for 
investor confidence and national economic performance. In April 2004 there were released 
the revised principles of corporate governance. 
Starting from different codes and practical models of governance, there were identified certain 
elements which define an efficient corporate governance. Thus, commonly accepted principles of 
corporate governance include the followings: 
- The rights and equitable treatment of shareholders: Organizations should respect the rights of 
shareholders and support shareholders to exercise those rights, including secure ownership of their 
shares, the right to full disclosure of information, voting rights, participation in decisions on sale or 
modification of corporate assets including mergers and new share issues. 
- Interests of other stakeholders: Organizations should recognize that they have legal and other 
obligations to all legitimate stakeholders. 
-  Role and responsibilities of the board: The board needs a range of skills and understanding to be 
able to deal with various business issues and have the ability to review and challenge management 
performance. These include concerns about corporate strategy, risk, executive compensation and 
performance, as well as accounting and reporting systems. 
- Integrity and ethical behavior: Organizations should develop a code of conduct for their directors 
and executives that promotes ethical and responsible decision making.  
- Disclosure and transparency: Organizations should clarify and make publicly known the roles and 
responsibilities of board and management to provide shareholders with a level of accountability. 
They should also implement procedures to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the 
company's financial reporting.  
Drawing up these principles reflects the main advantages offered by the corporate governance 
codes:  
-  stimulate debates about problems of corporate governance; 
-  encourage companies to adopt recognized standards of governance; 
-  offer explanations to investors about requirements and practices of corporate governance; 
- ensure informational base necessary for improving the regulations of the capital market and  
company law. 
In essence, the corporate governance code is a set of principles, standards and good governance 
methods whose implementation does not have a compulsory character, but an optional one.  
The corporate governance codes are issued by different entities, such as: stock exchanges, 
corporations, institutional investors, or associations (institutes) of directors and managers with the 
support of governments and international organizations. The variety of issuers generates implicitly a 
different official status of these corporate governance codes in issuing countries, and the codes 
present their point of view about what a good practice of corporate governance has to be.  
The main differences concerning governmental practices applied in different EU countries devolve 
from legislative regulations and rules of the capital market and not from the recommendations of 
the corporate governance codes which present important similarities. These differences do not 
generate unbreakable barriers for the functioning of the common capital market, so they do not 
impose the elaboration of a unique code of corporate governance. The existence of 
misunderstandings between these codes imposes the adaptation of specific measures in order to 
eliminate the regulation barriers of capital markets (informational) which could allow fair and easy 
evaluation of corporate governance of companies by the investors. 
The principal pro's and con's of the corporate governance codes from different countries concern 
various aspects of corporate governance, such as: representing employees, the rights of social 
partners of the company (stakeholders), rights of shareholders, the structure and responsibilities on 
the board of directors, the independence of the board of directors, the achievement of financial/non-
financial results. 
These are the reasons why many codes, including the OECD principles, fail to address some 
corporate governance issues and this could have negative effects in developing and emerging 
economies. But it should be also taken into consideration the general challenges confronting 
developing, emerging and transitional economies (CIPE, 2002), as follows: 
- establishing a rule-based (as opposed to a relationship-based) system of governance; 
- combating vested interests; 
- dismantling pyramid ownership structures that allow insiders to control; 
- establishing property rights systems that clearly and easily identify true owners; 
- de-politicizing decision-making and establishing firewalls between the government and 
management in corporative companies where the state is a dominant or majority shareholder; 
- protecting and enforcing minority shareholders’ rights; 
- preventing asset stripping after mass privatization; 
- finding active owners and skilled managers amid diffuse ownership structures; 
- promoting good governance within family-owned and concentrated ownership structures; 
- cultivating technical and professional know-how. 
A crucial weakness of the existing guidelines consists in the fact that the rules do not apply to all 
corporations equally (for example, do not apply to unlisted corporations). Besides, the role of debt 
and exit mechanisms is insufficiently addressed in many corporate governance codes and clear 
standards are needed to prevent connected lending which is widely practiced in some developed and 
developing economies. Therefore, in order to be effective, existing guidelines need to be 
supplemented to address these types of corporate governance issues as well. 
Moreover, in most developing economies, even the most basic democratic, market institutions may 
be undeveloped. In these circumstances, instituting corporate governance in these countries requires 
more than exporting well-established models of corporate governance that function in the developed 
economies. Therefore, in the developing and emerging countries, the institutional framework for 
effective corporate governance imposes the followings: 
- property rights is one of  the essential conditions necessary for a democratic, market-based 
economy and for ensuring the function of corporate governance measures; 
- a set of institutions that provides the essential legal and regulatory framework and a competitive 
self-enforcing environment (otherwise known as external controls). In the developing or emerging 
economy this regulatory framework is either absent or weak and these institutions can provide a 
playing field and ensure that internal corporate governance procedures adopted by firms are 
enforced and that management is responsible to owners and other stakeholders; 
- a well-regulated banking sector is an absolute prerequisite for a efficient functioning stock market 
and corporate sector because it provides the necessary capital and liquidity for corporate 
transactions and growth; 
- efficient capital markets can discipline insiders by sending price signals rapidly and allowing 
investors to liquidate their investment quickly and inexpensively; this affects the shares’ value of a 
company and a company access to capital; 
- competitive markets represent an important external control on companies forcing them to be 
efficient and productive. The lack of competitive markets discourages entrepreneurship, fosters 
management entrenchment and corruption and lowers productivity;  
- transparent and fair privatization procedures. The way enterprises are privatized not only affects 
the ownership structure but reflects a country’s corporate culture; 
- transparent, simple and fair taxation regimes. Tax laws and regulations should require adequate 
and timely disclosure of financial information, and should be enforced, consistently, timely and 
effectively; 
- an independent, well-functioning judicial system is one of the most important institutions of a 
democratic, market-based economy because it can enforces laws consistently, efficiently and fairly;  
- anti-corruption strategies. It is important to implement effective anti-corruption measures by 
specifying and streamlining legal and regulatory codes, clarifying laws on conflict of interest.  
Special attention needs to be given to establishing the necessary political and economic institutions 
that are tailored to every country specific needs. But the properly functioning of institutions can 
only enforce existing corporate governance guidelines and codes. If these guidelines or codes fail to 
address key corporate governance issues, even the best institutions will be unable to offer solutions. 
 
Models of corporate governance  
 
There are many different models of corporate governance around the world according to the variety 
of capitalism systems in which they are embedded. In order to analyze the models of corporate 
governance in the developing and emerging countries should be presented the main models used in 
the developed countries.  
In members states of European Union there are used two general models of corporate governance 
which present different characteristics: the Anglo-American model and the Continental European 
one.   
The Anglo-American Model of corporate governance (specific for firms from U.K., but also for 
those from USA, Hong Kong and Australia) tends to give priority to the interests of shareholders 
and encourages radical innovation and cost competition.  
This is an outsider-based system pursued by active capital markets trough the acquisitions and 
merges over listed companies. Thus, through the active capital markets it is developed the control of 
companies and transaction of securities, in condition of existence of dispersed shareholders. All 
countries which are characterized by this model have strongly developed capital markets, and 
protecting investors. As a result, in the Anglo-American countries (U.K., U.S., Australia and 
Canada) the companies have generally similar models of corporate governance, respective one 
independent board of directors, which monitories and controls management's activity for the 
purpose of improving it, but the latest control possibility, improving and recovery of company's 
performances it is done throughout hostile takeovers. 
The Continental European (German) model of corporate governance (specific to companies from 
continental Europe, as well from Japan) is an insider-based system; it is not focused on the strong 
influence exerted by active capital markets, but on the existence of strong stakeholders, such as 
banks. This model recognizes the interests of workers, managers, suppliers, customers and the 
community and it facilitates innovation and competition. 
The characteristics of this model emerge from particularities of the social and commercial 
environment where they first appeared. Thus, in Germany, as well as in Japan, shareholders who 
own high portfolios of stocks usually get actively involved in the management of the respective 
companies. Their role is to sanction low quality management, to stimulate economical efficiency 
and to harmonize the interests of the firm's social partners, including its staff. Human capital is 
considered having the biggest importance in the German model.  
Unlike the Anglo-American model, which is based mainly on the capital market, the German model 
is concentrated on the banking system. Although in Germany and in Japan banks do not have high 
stocks as a part of firms they finance, yet they exert a strong influence and control over their 
governance system. The main advantage of this model is monitoring and flexible financing of firms, 
as well as efficient communication between banks and companies. The strong involvements of 
banks in managing firms give a special stability and a priority orientation to this system towards 
economical development.  
It is evident that both insider and outsider systems have to face inherent risks. Corporate governance 
systems are designed to minimize these risks and to promote political and economic development. 
An effective corporate governance system relies on a combination of internal and external controls. 
Internal controls are arrangements within a corporation that aim to minimize risk by defining the 
relationships between managers, shareholders, boards of directors, and stakeholders. In order for 
these measures to have a meaningful effect, they must be buttressed by a variety of extra-firm 
institutions tailored to a country’s environment (referred to as external controls). 
The comparing analysis of advantages and disadvantages of both models of corporate governance, 
the Anglo-American model and the German-Japanese model, suggests that a company's system of 
governance may be improved as an effect of the next factors: 
- the firm acquisitions - in developed countries, such as Great Britain, U.S.A., France, Germany, 
Japan there is a regulated market of acquisitions; 
- the competitiveness of products and services influence the corporate governance of a company, 
but the action of this factor is slow, shareholders may lose huge amounts of money as a result of 
damaging the quality of the products, losing clients and some market segments because of low 
efficiency of firm's management; 
- capital market, which actually offers official recognition of a firm's performances and implicitly of 
management through the level of the firm's share prices;  
- institutional investors represent a potential force of influencing the governance of a company, 
especially in Great Britain and U.S. Meanwhile, they constitute a danger from the point of view of 
the powerful control they may exert over firms despite a big percent of holdings in their social 
capital; 
- the labor market for managers, who sanctions the managers which get excessive benefits without 
having performances, by replacing them in the managing board. 
Although there are considerable differences between the Anglo-American and German system, they 
all define the subject of corporate governance within the context of functioning market systems and 
highly developed legal institutions. But, many developing and emerging economies lack or are in 
the process of developing the most basic market institutions. Hence, corporate governance in these 
contexts involves a much wider range of issues.  
Solving corporate governance problems in developing and emerging economies involves going 
beyond a narrow view of how interrelate the owners and managers of capital. In these economies, 
the corporate governance systems depend on a set of institutions (laws, regulations, contracts and 
norms) that enable self-governing firms to operate as the central element of a competitive market 
economy.  
These institutions ensure that the internal corporate government procedures adopted by the firms are 
enforced and that management is responsible to owners (shareholders) and other stakeholders. The 
key point is that the public and private sectors have to work together to develop a set of rules that 
are binding on all and which establish the ways in which companies have to govern themselves. 
 
Specific features of corporate governance in Romania 
 
The enterprises from Central and Eastern European countries (including Romania) have a common 
governance model based on internal control, as a result of the privatization and reorganization 
process. In this context, the insider - based model could be redefined as a form of organization of 
firms resulted from buying up control rights by the managers or the employees of ex-enterprises 
owned by the state during the privatization process, from owning substantial stocks portfolios by 
insiders in case of the privatization process, or from exerting their interests in the decisions process 
at the level of the strategic enterprises, when they are still in the state property. 
The inside control is considered an essential issue because the managers who own an excessive 
control on the enterprises may act in the detriment of shareholders, employees and other 
stakeholders, affecting thus the financial results and firm performance. In these circumstances it 
should be underlined the necessity of getting efficient this system by developing capital markets and 
banking systems as ways to influence internally or externally the systems of corporate governance 
for firms in the developing and emerging economies. 
Inevitably, establishing some adequate mechanisms of corporate governance of privatized 
enterprises in these countries was difficult in the conditions of the lack of a legal infrastructure, as 
well as lack of regulations about property rights, demands of accounting-financial  reports, firms 
bankruptcy etc.  
The structures of firm’s governance in European countries in transition were strongly influenced by 
the objectives of the privatization process, such as political responsibility, legal regulations and the 
efficiency of the privatization. Taking into consideration the priority of these objectives and 
political and economic conditions, the privatization process has registered relatively different forms 
in Central and Eastern European countries. As a result, the corporate governance systems from 
Central and Eastern European countries are inefficient, as a result of focusing power by the 
employees, management and as a result of the lack of outside or inside control exerted by the other 
stakeholders, such as banks, institutional investors, or through active capital markets. 
Although there are signs that the financial results of privatized firms are in average superior to ex-
state enterprises, the reorganization is still done in a slow rate, and the process of investing is very 
low, which will affect long term performances of respective firms. Although the extent of remaining 
government ownership differs from one country to another, private ownership dominates 
everywhere. Ownership and control are becoming increasingly concentrated, with the emergence of 
corporate groupings and significant foreign owners in most countries. As firms grow in size, 
ownership and control are separated, primarily by the use of a pyramid structure. Most firms in 
Central and Eastern Europe are still owner-managed, but professional management is becoming 
more common (Berklof, Pajuste, 2003) 
In Romania, the companies are characterized by the same general model of corporate governance, 
the insider - based control of employees and management, but with certain particularities regarding 
national, economical, social, politic, cultural conditions, where governance forms appeared and 
developed. 
The corporate governance of Romanian enterprises and at the same time the trend of their 
performances can not be analyzed and understood just through the evolution of the reform process, 
in the context of transition from planned economy to market economy, what determined deep 
changes in the macroeconomic universe. 
The main methods of privatization which generated the formation of the private sector in Romania 
were: MEBO method, mass privatization program or privatization through sales to investors outside 
the enterprises. As a result of the privatization process in Romania there are the following types of 
corporate governance of enterprises:  
- Firms owned by the state (total or partial) - where the state is still the main shareholder. In these 
firms there is inevitably a conflict of interests between managers, employees and the state, caused 
by contradictory objectives: maximizing the profit, maintaining jobs, raising the income from taxes, 
satisfying political or individual interests. Economical performance is not the major objective of 
these economical entities; the interests of managers from these enterprises are rarely subordinated to 
shareholders interests. 
- Private closed firms (small, medium or large enterprises, whose shares are not traded on an official 
market). Owners are usually also managers, so there is not a conflict of interests between the two 
parts. In return, there are numerous conflicts between shareholders. Managers do not have the 
priority to maximize the value of the firm, but expanding the business. 
- Privatized or opened companies, which know a variety of forms, from the very dispersed ones in 
which the shareholders’ rights are usually neglected, till those where shareholders have a strong 
control over the enterprise. In such enterprises there is a conflict between management and 
shareholders or between the stakeholders and shareholders. As in the case of private closed firms, 
the decisional and operational autonomy of the managerial team is high, the organizational 
structures and informational systems are flexible, dynamic and efficient. 
The principles of corporate governance imply a series of measures that lead, finally, to the growing 
of transparency of listed companies, what makes them more attractive. That is why implementing 
the corporate governance code of OECD has preoccupied the representatives of Stock Exchange 
from Bucharest for many years. A first step was made in August 2001, when the Bucharest Stock 
Exchange elaborated a Code of Corporate Governance and introduced a virtual tier, the Plus tier, 
for the listed companies which wanted to implement the principles of corporate governance. In 
2003, it was founded the Institute of Corporate Governance of BVB (Bucharest Stock Exchange) in 
order to increase the professional standards for managers. 
The principles of the corporate governance were included in the capital market legislation. But the 
new capital market law has yet its disadvantages: it is too general, leaving place for interpretations, 
being implemented just partially the principles of corporate governance.  
Even in the last years there were registered positive effects regarding the opening of the managers 
towards the communication with the investors, the expected results regarding the implementation of 
corporate governance principle did not appeared. Therefore, Bucharest Stock Exchange intends to 
elaborate in 2008 a new Code of Corporate Governance, more complex and more adapted to the 
European legislation.  
Besides the principles of corporate governance or more strict rules regarding the informing of 
investors, the new code will introduce a new issue for the Romanian market: the concept of 
independent leadership. Another novelty is the fact that the listed companies can implement 
voluntary the code, but they should mention it in the yearly report and they have to motivate the 
rejection/inobservance of some of the stipulations (the principle "comply or explain").  
An argument in favor of implementing the principles of transparency consist on the fact that the 
well administrated companies, with strong corporate governance structures, with appropriate social 
and environment programs register a higher performance on the market in comparison with the 
competitors.  
By contrary, the inefficient governance of listed companies influences negatively the economic-
financial results and their possibilities of future developing taking in consideration the followings: 
- the decrease of the rhythm for the restructuring and reorganization; 
- following mainly short term purposes of employees and managers, such as rising salaries and 
other bonuses, stability and protection of work places; 
-  lack of investments for modernization or developing the productive potential of enterprises; 
-  excessive mobility of staff as a result of intern conflicts; 
-  the delayed/lack of dividend distribution to the other shareholders in order to offer premiums for 
the managers and employees at the end of the year; 
- restricting the transactions of securities on the capital market which determines the increase of 
volatility and the investment risk for these securities; 
-  existence of conflicts between managers and/or employees and shareholders, or the conflict 
between stakeholders and shareholders; 
-  low prestige on the market for the listed firms, etc. 
Among the most important ways of encroaching upon the rights of shareholders in Romania are the 
followings: dilution of the shareholders’ earnings; transferring profits outside the company; abusive 
allocation of the profits; delay in offering the dividends; limited access for shareholders to 
information. 
The main problem of corporate firms in Romania is the conflict of interests between stakeholders 
and shareholders which generates misunderstandings between management and shareholders, as 
well as between shareholders and business partners of the company, typical especially in developing 
economies, leading to the decrease of long term performances of the companies and even their 
bankruptcy.  
 
Conclusions 
  
A healthy and competitive private sector is becoming increasingly important for developing nations. 
In the context of globalization and integration of national economies, corporate governance is 
considered as an important comparative advantage of companies and countries, because it increases 
foreign investors’ confidence in the private sector. Besides, as a result of the reducing the public 
sector that occurred during the last two decades, the private sector has become an increasingly 
important provider of public assets. Therefore, corporate governance is a tool of oversight that 
provides information about the functioning and performance of private firms but also about the 
economies. 
The corporate governance system of listed enterprises becomes a condition for the level of current 
economic-accounting performances, but also for the expectations of investors concerning their 
future developing. Thus, on one side, the quality of managing systems represents an essential non-
financial variable for appreciating the global performance of enterprises listed on the capital market. 
On the other side, the capital market through the functions of redistributing the available capital and 
financing profitable investments, may contribute to the improvement of the governance system for 
listed companies and implicitly to increase their performances, through mergers and acquisitions or 
through active involvement of institutional investors in their management. 
The corporate governance of Romanian enterprises have to be analyzed taking into consideration 
the evolution of the transition and reform process, which determined many changes in the economic 
framework.  
Romanian companies listed on the capital market have merged from the privatization process, 
which determined the formation on one side, of extremely dispersed shareholders, inactive in 
administrating firms, and on the other side, the appearance of a very strong group of shareholders. 
These companies have a form of governance dominated by management and employees or 
shareholders control, despite the interests of stakeholders and other social partners. The most 
important problem is the violation of the rights of shareholders and minimizing their incomes. The 
managing board and censors have just a formal role of approving manger's or shareholder's 
decisions. 
The efforts toward an effective corporate governance system are more and more justified, 
especially in the developing and emerging countries, taking in consideration the followings 
advantages: 
- it could promote the efficient use of resources both within the company and the economy. The 
debt and equity capital should flow to those corporations capable to invest it efficiently, with the 
highest rate of return; 
-  it as a mechanism which can contribute to the development of financial and equity markets. 
because corporate governance generates lower transaction costs associated with corporate 
information access and diminishes the managerial incentives for risky profits; 
- it facilitates the access to capital. Insufficient and inadequate access to capital is one of the most 
common problems that developing countries have to face. Better corporate governance practices 
influence the perception of investors the firms could have as effect an easier access to financing 
sources; 
- it could be a complement to institutional and legal framework. A solid institutional framework 
promotes private sector development, reduces transaction costs and encourages an effective private 
sector;  
- it could contribute to the reduction of corruption in business. Although it may not prevent 
corruption, effective governance could allow that corrupt practices to be discovered early and 
eliminated. 
In conclusion, it is increasingly clear that having a transparent and fair system to govern markets, 
fair treatment of all stakeholders, and a chance for every entrepreneur to be successful, are crucial 
for developing and emerging economies. Corporate governance creates safeguards against 
mismanagement and corruption and can promote fundamental values of a market economy in a 
democratic society. 
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